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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a generic drug 
manufacturer, and several other Plaintiffs (hereinafter 
“Mylan”) originally brought this action against Defendants, 
Warner Chilcott and Mayne Pharma, both name-brand drug 
manufacturers.  Defendants manufacture and sell “Doryx,” 
the name-brand version of delayed-release doxycycline 
hyclate, an oral antibiotic of the tetracycline class used to 
treat severe acne.  Tetracyclines are a broad category of 
antibiotics, the most common being doxycycline 
monohydrate and minocycline, which vary in their use and 
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efficacy.  Mylan alleges, among other things, that Defendants 
conspired to protect their position in the market through 
“product hopping,” which involves making various 
insignificant modifications to a drug to keep generic 
competitors out of the market by forcing them to re-enter a 
cumbersome regulatory approval process. 
 After several Plaintiffs in this action settled their cases, 
Mylan was the only remaining Plaintiff.  Mylan claims that 
Defendants are liable for: (1) creating an unlawful monopoly 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) attempted unlawful 
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act; (3) entering 
into an agreement in restraint of trade under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act; and (4) tortiously interfering with prospective 
contractual relationships under Pennsylvania law.  The Parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District 
Court granted Defendants’ and denied Plaintiff’s.  In doing 
so, the District Court held that Defendants’ conduct was not 
anticompetitive, and that, even if it was, Mylan’s claims 
failed because it did not establish that Defendants had the 
requisite market power in the relevant product market.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 We begin by describing the complex regulatory and 
industry-specific framework involved in most, if not all, 
pharmaceutical “product hopping” cases.2   
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1332(a), 1337(a), and 1367(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. Federal and State Law Governing Drug 
Approval 
 The pharmaceutical industry consists of both name-
brand and generic drug manufacturers.  In general, generic 
drugs are priced lower than, and compete with, their name-
brand counterparts.3  Both types of drugs are subject to 
certain approval requirements before they can be sold to the 
public.  In particular, a company that wishes to market a new 
pharmaceutical product in the United States must first obtain 
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).4  
This is called the New Drug Application (“NDA”) process.5 
    Prior to 1984, both name-brand and generic drug 
manufacturers were required to go through the same NDA 
process.  That year, Congress passed the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.6  The Act loosened the approval 
rules for generics by creating an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”) process.7  The ANDA process 
                                                                                                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the record 
before the District Court. 
3 In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(noting the price savings for low-income individuals between 
generic drugs and their name-brand equivalents). 
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355.   
5 Id. 
6 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
7 See id. §§ 101-106, 98 Stat. 1585-97.   
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permits generic drug companies to rely on a name-brand drug 
company’s original NDA approval for a particular drug in 
order to gain quicker, less costly FDA approval of a generic 
version of the drug.8  By enabling generic manufacturers to 
“piggy-back on a brand drug’s scientific studies” and the 
significant costs associated with their NDA, Hatch-Waxman 
“speeds the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market, 
thereby furthering drug competition.”9  
 To rely on a name-brand’s NDA, however, the generic 
drug manufacturer must demonstrate that the proposed 
generic product is both a “bioequivalent” and a 
“pharmaceutical” equivalent of the name-brand drug.10  Put 
simply, these two equivalencies require a generic company 
filing an ANDA to show a certain level of design and 
formulaic similarity between its product and the approved 
drug.  ANDA filers that successfully show that their drug is 
bioequivalent and pharmaceutically equivalent can then have 
their product deemed “AB-rated” to the name-brand drug by 
the FDA. 
 To be sure, once obtained, the AB rating carries a 
considerable corollary benefit for generics under state law.  
Every state in the United States has drug substitution laws.11  
                                              
8 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).  
9 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013) (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).    
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); New York ex rel. 
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 
2015) (hereinafter “Namenda”).    
11 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 644. 
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These state substitution laws “either permit or require 
pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent, lower-
cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent express 
direction from the prescribing physician that the prescription 
must be dispensed as written.”12 Taken together, these laws 
oftentimes make obtaining a prescription cheaper for the 
consumer, and they can also prove to be highly profitable for 
generic drug companies.13  
 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
recently noted in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis 
PLC (hereafter “Namenda”),14 Hatch-Waxman and state 
substitution laws also reflect the fact that the pharmaceutical 
market functions in a unique way.15  As the Namenda Court 
put it, “[i]n a well-functioning market, a consumer selects and 
                                              
12  Id. at 645. 
13 See, e.g., New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473 
(RWS), 2014 WL 7015198, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014); 
Stacey B. Lee, Pliva v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’ 
Unfortunate Hand, 12 Yale J. Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 209, 
239 (2012) (noting role played by state substitution laws in 
“help[ing] generic manufacturers earn above-average profit 
margins”). Generic drugs are reported to have accounted for 
over 80% of the prescriptions dispensed in 2014, see Amicus 
Br. of FTC 6, and can save patients billions of dollars, see 
Amici Br. of AARP et al. 6 (“In 2013 alone, generic 
medications saved consumers $239 billion.”).  
14 “Namenda” is the brand name for the prescription drug at 
issue in that case.  As the parties have done, we will therefore 
refer to this case as “Namenda.” 
15 787 F.3d at 645-46. 
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pays for a product after evaluating the price and quality of the 
product.”16  In the prescription drug market, by contrast, the 
doctor selects the drug, which creates a certain separation 
between the buyer and the manufacturer.17  Moreover, in most 
cases, a third-party, such as a health insurance company, pays 
for the drug.18  As a result, consumer buying behavior may 
have less of an impact on manufacturer pricing than it 
otherwise would in a traditional open market.   
 With this regulatory and market framework in mind, 
we turn to the facts in this case. 
B. The Parties and Product Development 
 The parties in this case are manufacturers and sellers 
of generic and name-brand pharmaceutical drugs worldwide. 
Defendant Mayne is a pharmaceutical company 
headquartered in Australia. Defendant Warner Chilcott acted 
as a United States distributor of Mayne’s Doryx product, in 
both name-brand and generic form, for a number of years.  
Plaintiff Mylan, a generic drug manufacturer, began its effort 
to produce a generic version of Doryx in 2003. 
 A form of Doryx had been on the market for many 
years.  In 1985, the FDA approved Mayne’s Doryx capsules, 
an unpatented delayed-release version of doxycycline hyclate, 
for sale to the public.  In the meantime, using Warner as a 
domestic sales channel, Mayne sold both branded and generic 
versions of Doryx for many years in the United States, but the 
                                              
16 Id. at 645. 
17 Id. at 645-46. 
18 Id. at 646. 
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effort did not prove to be fruitful.  Faced with shrinking 
profits in the early 1990s, Mayne contacted Warner to 
strategically bolster the Doryx brand instead of focusing on 
its generic version of the drug.     
 To sort out their strategy for growing the Doryx brand, 
Mayne and Warner entered into a licensing agreement in 
1997.  Under the contract, they agreed to take certain steps to 
bring a new Doryx product to the market.  Mayne also agreed 
to pull its generic version of Doryx from the market, and 
Warner agreed to act as the exclusive distributor of Doryx in 
the United States.  Warner further agreed to market and 
promote Doryx in return for the rights to all income from 
domestic sales and to use Mayne as its exclusive 
manufacturer and supplier.  The parties also agreed to 
develop a delayed release Doryx tablet, as opposed to the 
capsule previously marketed, for Warner to sell in the United 
States.   
 The FDA approved Defendants’ NDA for Doryx 75mg 
and 100mg tablets in May 2005.  Defendants then introduced 
them to the market in September 2005 in an effort to 
transition the market for Doryx capsules over to Doryx 
tablets.  As the District Court noted, it appears that 
Defendants took a number of steps regarding the capsules 
that, in conjunction, Mylan claims violated the Sherman Act.  
In particular, Defendants: 
(1) stopped selling the capsules to wholesalers; 
(2) removed Doryx capsules from the Warner 
Chilcott website; (3) worked with retailers to 
“auto-reference” the Doryx tablet whenever a 
doctor filed a Doryx prescription; (4) informed 
wholesalers, retailers, and doctors that “Doryx 
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Capsules have been replaced by Doryx 
Tablets”; (5) destroyed some of their remaining 
capsule inventory; and (6) bought back some 
portion of the remaining capsule inventory.19   
Mylan refers to these steps as a “hard switch” from capsules 
to tablets and claims that this was done in an effort to stifle 
generic competition.20    
 Beginning in 2007, Defendants made a number of 
other changes to the existing Doryx product and thereafter 
pulled older versions from the market.  Each of these changes 
would have required generic manufacturers to file, and await 
approval of, a new ANDA demonstrating the similarities 
between their product and the reformulated Doryx product in 
order to continue selling generics that were AB-rated to the 
newest Doryx product.   
 First, Defendants worked to develop a 150mg strength 
Doryx tablet, in contrast to the previously available 75mg and 
100mg tablets.  The 150mg tablet would have a “score,” 
which the District Court described as “a groove running 
across the tablet’s surface.”21 The score would allow a patient 
to divide a 150mg Doryx tablet into two 75mg doses if the 
                                              
19 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-
3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) 
(record citations omitted).  
20 See Mylan Br. 11, 42 (referring to Defendants’ conduct of 
pulling the Doryx capsule from the market, destroying 
existing supplies, and introducing the Doryx tablet as a “hard 
switch”).  
21 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *3.  
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patient, for instance, needed to self-adjust dosing based on 
sensitivity, doctor recommendation, or for any other reason.  
Defendants sought FDA approval for the 150mg single-
scored tablet in December 2007, it was approved by the FDA 
in June 2008, and Defendants thereafter began marketing the 
tablet.  
 Soon after, Defendants turned their focus from 
marketing the unscored 75mg and 100mg tablets to marketing 
the 150mg single-scored tablet.  Like the 150mg tablets, they 
then added a score to the 75mg and 100mg unscored Doryx 
tablets.  The FDA approved the 75mg and 100mg scored 
tablets in early 2009.   
 Defendants then made another change to the Doryx 
150mg tablet in 2010 by adding a second score line to the 
tablet.  This dual-scored tablet could be split into two or three 
pieces, further enhancing a patient’s ability to control self-
dosing.  After Defendants submitted their application for the 
dual-scored 150mg tablet to the FDA in February 2011, they 
then pulled the 75mg and 100mg single-scored Doryx tablets 
from the market.  Then, after receiving approval in fall 2011 
for the dual-scored 150mg tablet, Defendants stopped 
distributing single-scored 150mg tablets, just as they had 
done with the 75mg and 100mg single-scored tablets.    
 All told, it appears that Defendants made four critical 
changes to Doryx, all of which required generics to apply for 
AB-rating if they wanted to continue to benefit from state 
16 
 
substitution laws.22  These modifications spurred this 
litigation. 
C. Mylan’s Efforts to Compete 
with Warner and Mayne Using 
Generic Doryx 
 It is also important to our discussion to note Mylan’s 
parallel efforts to effectively compete with Defendants when 
they made each of the above-mentioned changes to name-
brand Doryx.  In particular, these efforts will be relevant to 
our discussion of whether Defendants’ product changes had 
exclusionary effects on generic competition.     
  The capsule version of Doryx was unpatented for the 
first nineteen years after Mayne introduced Doryx to the 
market.  During that period, another generic manufacturer, 
Sandoz, created its own generic version of the capsule.  
Mylan did not begin developing a generic Doryx capsule until 
April 2003.  These efforts failed, however, and Mylan finally 
gave up on trying to create a capsule for marketing and sale 
around late 2005.   
Instead of making a capsule, Mylan chose to develop 
generic versions of 75mg and 100mg doxycycline hyclate 
tablets.  By September 2006, Mylan had created the formula 
for a generic tablet and, in March 2008, it filed an ANDA for 
approval.  However, the FDA delayed its approval when 
Defendants’ scored version of Doryx was released, because, 
                                              
22 In April 2013, Defendants introduced a 200mg Doryx 
tablet as a treatment for chlamydia, a sexually transmitted 
disease.  The 200mg tablet was not approved by the FDA for 
acne treatment, unlike the previous versions of the drug.  
17 
 
among other complications, Mylan was then required, in 
accordance with FDA regulations, to alter its original tablet 
design to achieve an AB rating.  The FDA finally approved 
Mylan’s scored 75mg and 100mg generic tablets in December 
2010, by which time Defendants were focused on marketing 
their single scored-version of the 150mg tablets.  At that time, 
the FDA had, nonetheless, granted Mylan 180 days of 
exclusive selling rights for its generic version of the tablet, 
allowing Mylan to profit without any generic competition.   
 Finally, Mylan created a generic version of 
Defendants’ 150mg single-scored tablet in late 2008, and the 
FDA granted approval of the drug in February 2012.  By that 
point, however, Defendants had already received approval for 
their dual-scored 150mg tablet and were focused on 
marketing that version of the drug.  This suit followed. 
D. The Underlying Litigation 
 Mylan filed this lawsuit in July 2012, alleging 
violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.23  It also asserted 
a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations 
under Pennsylvania law.  The crux of Mylan’s complaint is 
that Defendants’ product changes had “little or no therapeutic 
benefit,”24 and that they served no purpose other than 
preventing generics from obtaining the benefit of automatic 
                                              
23 This case was quickly consolidated with parallel lawsuits 
filed by other Plaintiffs.  As noted, the other Plaintiffs settled 
their cases, leaving only Mylan to litigate its claims against 
Defendants. 
24 JA 154. 
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substitution under Hatch-Waxman and various state laws.25  
Mylan further claims that Defendants’ anticompetitive 
“product hopping” strategy was designed to frustrate their 
efforts to release a generic version of Doryx to the market.26 
In support of its cross-motion for summary judgment before 
the District Court, Mylan specifically argued that the 
following four “hops” were anticompetitive: 
 (1) 2005 change from 75mg and 100mg capsules to 
75mg and 100mg tablets; 
 (2) 2008 introduction of a single-scored 150mg tablet;      
 (3) 2009 addition of a single score to 75mg and 100mg 
tablets; and  
 (4) 2011 change from single to dual score on the 
150mg tablet.27  
   In granting Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment and denying Mylan’s cross-motion, the District 
Court found, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
Mylan, that Defendants had indeed made the Doryx “hops” 
primarily to “delay generic market entry.”28  Nonetheless, the 
court went on to conclude that Mylan’s antitrust claims failed 
as a matter of law.  With respect to the § 2 monopolization 
claim, the District Court held that Mylan failed to muster 
                                              
25 JA 178-80. 
26 JA 154. 
27 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *5. 
28 Id. 
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sufficient evidence of Defendants’ monopoly power.29  It 
rejected Mylan’s narrow view of the market – comprising 
only branded and generic Doryx – and determined that the 
relevant product market was a broader one, consisting of 
name-brand Doryx and all oral tetracyclines prescribed to 
treat acne.30  And, within this larger market, the District Court 
found that Defendants’ market share was – at most – only 
about 18%, an amount insufficient to show that Defendants 
exercised monopoly power.31  The District Court stated: 
In sum, Mylan has failed to produce 
economically plausible evidence to prove that 
Defendants hold monopoly power in the 
relevant market. Nor has Mylan shown that 
other factors might support finding that 
Defendants exercise monopoly power in the 
absence of predominant market share.32 
 As an alternative ground, the District Court also 
granted summary judgment to the Defendants on both 
Sherman Act claims because Mylan failed to put forth 
sufficient evidence of anticompetitive conduct.33  The District 
Court held that Defendants did not exclude competition when 
they made product changes.34  In particular, it found that 
                                              
29 Id. at *7-11. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at *8. 
32 Id. at *11. 
33 Id. at *12-16. 
34 Id. 
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Mylan was free to introduce a generic Doryx capsule any 
time after 1985, but it failed to do so, and that Mylan 
successfully introduced generic 75mg, 100mg, and 150mg 
Doryx tablets.35  As the District Court observed:   
Throughout this period, doctors remained free 
to prescribe generic Doryx; pharmacists 
remained free to substitute generics when 
medically appropriate; and patients remained 
free to ask their doctors and pharmacists for 
generic versions of the drug.36   
 The District Court also concluded that Mylan had 
failed to even attempt to market generic Doryx, “relying 
instead on the ‘promotion’ provided by state automatic 
substitution laws,”37 and that “Defendants have no duty to 
facilitate Mylan’s business plan by keeping older versions of 
branded Doryx on the market.”38  The District Court also 
distinguished a number of key cases dealing with alleged 
product hops, ultimately concluding that they were 
procedurally inapplicable.39   
                                              
35 Id. at *12. 
36 Id. at *13. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *14. 
39 Id. at *15 (citing Actavis, 2014 WL 7015198; In re 
Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) 
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2014); 
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 
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 Finally, the Court addressed a concern about turning 
federal courts into innovation sufficiency tribunals, stating: 
Adoption of Mylan’s theory of “anticompetitive 
product redesign” could well have adverse, 
unintended consequences.  Any time a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer changes the 
formulation of a branded drug and so compels a 
manufacturer to reformulate (or, as in the 
instant case, formulate for the first time) its 
generic, this could trigger a . . . burden-shifting 
contest.  Once the branded drug manufacturer 
offered a procompetitive justification for the 
product change that the generic manufacturer 
could not rebut, courts and juries would have to 
determine which product changes were 
“sufficiently innovative” to justify their 
anticompetitive effects.  Mylan has failed to 
offer an intelligible test of innovation 
“sufficiency,” and I doubt that courts could ever 
fashion one.  Mylan’s theory also risks slowing 
or even stopping pharmaceutical innovation.  
The prospect of costly and uncertain litigation 
every time a company reformulates a brand-
name drug would likely increase costs and 
discourage manufacturers from seeking to 
improve existing drugs.40 
                                                                                                     
146, 151 (D.D.C. 2008); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 422 (D. Del. 2006)). 
40 Id. at *15-16 (internal citations omitted). 
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 After addressing Mylan’s Sherman Act claims, the 
District Court also granted Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment on Mylan’s claim of tortious interference with 
prospective contractual relations under Pennsylvania law, 
concluding that the only alleged “interference” with 
prospective customers was “privileged,” in the sense that 
Pennsylvania law permits “competitors, in certain 
circumstances . . . to interfere with others’ prospective 
contractual relationships.”41  Mylan’s appeal followed.42    
                                              
41 Id. at *17 (quoting Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical 
Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 215 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted)). 
42 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and 
apply the same standard as the District Court.  Cosmetic 
Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 48 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
Inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 
(1986). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. Sherman Act Claims 
1. Mylan’s Section 2 
Claims: Attempted and 
Actual Monopolization 
Because both the District Court and the parties’ 
arguments focus heavily on Mylan’s monopolization and 
attempted monopolization claims under § 2, we will address 
those claims first.43   
                                              
43 As an initial matter, Defendants assert that Mylan lacks 
antitrust standing, because Mylan suffered no antitrust injury.  
(Defs.’ Br. 89-92.)  Antitrust standing is a prudential 
limitation, and we assess several factors to determine its 
presence.  See Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 
223, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2013).  Specifically, we consider: (1) the 
causal connection between an alleged antitrust violation and 
harm to the plaintiff as well as the defendant’s intent to cause 
that harm; (2) whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury of 
the type the antitrust laws intend to redress; (3) the 
“directness of the injury,” which seeks to preclude 
“speculative” claims; (4) the existence of more direct victims 
of the alleged violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or “complex apportionment of damages.”  Id. (citing 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 
1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993)).  We reject Defendants’ 
contention.  Although we ultimately conclude that Mylan has 
failed to create fact issues for a jury on any of its claims, 
Mylan has offered at least some proof to satisfy each of these 
elements.  We therefore conclude that Mylan has antitrust 
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 Section 2 of the Sherman Act “makes it unlawful to 
monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to 
monopolize, interstate or international commerce.”44  To 
support a claim for actual monopolization, a party must 
prove: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”45  By contrast, to succeed on a claim of 
attempted monopolization under § 2, a plaintiff must prove 
“(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power.”46   
 We begin our analysis with the first element of 
Mylan’s actual monopolization claim under § 2: Defendants’ 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.  
                                                                                                     
standing. See also W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. 
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“competitors in the restrained market” are among those 
capable of satisfying the antitrust-injury requirement).  
44 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 306 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2). 
45 Id. at 307 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
46 Id. at 317 (quoting Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. 
Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 159 F.3d 129, 141 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
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Monopoly power can be demonstrated through direct or 
indirect evidence.47  Mylan has provided neither.  
a. Direct Evidence of 
Monopoly Power 
 We have previously stated in Broadcom Corp. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc. that monopoly power is “the ability to 
control prices and exclude competition in a given market.”48  
We also stated there that, “[i]f a firm can profitably raise 
prices without causing competing firms to expand output and 
drive down prices, that firm has monopoly power,”49 and 
therefore “[t]he existence of monopoly power may be proven 
through direct evidence of supracompetitive prices and 
restricted output.”50  However, we have elsewhere 
emphasized that direct evidence of monopoly power to prove 
one’s claims is only “rarely available.”51  And, to support a 
claim that a defendant set supracompetitive prices through 
direct evidence, a plaintiff must often provide an analysis of 
the defendant’s costs, showing both that the defendant had an 
                                              
47 Id. at 307. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 
381 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 
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“abnormally high price-cost margin” and that the defendant 
“restricted output.”52 
To determine whether Mylan has offered the “rare” 
form of direct evidence of monopoly power, we must first 
examine whether the record includes any proof of 
Defendants’ market power based on supracompetitive pricing 
or restricted output.53  To support such a claim, Mylan relies 
heavily on its own expert testimony.   
 Here, in noting that Mylan failed to establish 
monopoly power, the District Court concluded: 
Mylan has not made a serious effort to present 
direct evidence of Defendants’ monopoly 
power. To begin, Mylan offers no evidence of 
Defendants’ “price-cost margins” for Doryx, 
nor does it explain whether those margins were 
abnormally high.  Mylan’s economic expert, Dr. 
Rubenfeld, elected to forego any analysis of 
                                              
52 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 386 F.3d 
485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004). 
53 Mylan contends that we should look to its proffered expert 
testimony to conclude that Defendants exercised monopoly 
power even in the absence of clear evidence of 
supracompetitive prices or restricted output.  We disagree.  
See Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307; see also Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 
(1992) (stating that “[m]arket power is the power ‘to force a 
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a 
competitive market’” (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984))). 
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Defendants’ margins because, as he opined, 
other available evidence of monopoly power 
was “more compelling,” and margins are 
“difficult to measure” and “imperfect indicators 
of market power.”  Dr. Rubenfeld nonetheless 
states that at least some of Defendants’ data 
suggested a margin of 83% in the second 
quarter of 2006–without explaining whether 
that figure is abnormally high.   Regardless of 
whether or not evidence of Defendants’ 
marginal and fixed costs was “compelling” or 
“difficult to measure,” it is still required to 
prove monopoly power directly.  Mylan has not 
made such a showing.  Mylan also fails to show 
that Defendants restricted Doryx output to 
maintain monopoly profits, and fails to discuss 
the quantity of Doryx Defendants manufactured 
during the relevant period.   In these 
circumstances, Mylan has not presented 
plausible direct evidence of market power.54 
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis.  We have 
held that expert testimony in support of summary judgment 
that contains only “general and theoretical observations and 
[which] is not tied to evidence in the record” can be 
“disregard[ed].”55 As the District Court correctly observed, 
Mylan’s expert reports are devoid of any substantiated 
quantitative analysis showing that Defendants maintained 
                                              
54 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *7 (internal citations 
and record citations omitted).  
55 Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 
F.3d 1026, 1040 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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high price-cost margins or that Defendants markedly 
restricted output.  And, to the extent that Mylan’s experts 
offered any such conclusions, they were largely theoretical in 
nature.  Accordingly, Mylan has failed to provide direct 
evidence of monopoly power.   
b. Indirect Evidence of 
Monopoly Power 
 The second and more common way that a party may 
prove monopoly power is by providing indirect evidence, 
which includes “structural evidence of a monopolized 
market.”56  To support a claim of monopoly power through 
indirect evidence, Mylan must show that (1) Defendants had 
market power in the relevant market and (2) that there were 
barriers to entry into the market.57   
  “Proving the existence of monopoly power through 
indirect evidence requires a definition of the relevant 
                                              
56 Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 381 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that direct 
proof is “only rarely available, [and] courts more typically 
examine market structure in search of circumstantial evidence 
of monopoly power” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
57 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307 (citing Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d at 51).  The relevant market determination typically 
has both product and geographic components.  See Borough 
of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 
1982).  Defendants do not contest Mylan’s expert’s 
conclusion that the relevant geographic market is the United 
States.  We therefore focus solely on the product component. 
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market,”58 and “[t]he scope of the market is a question of fact 
as to which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.”59  The 
question in this case, as in others, is whether the relevant 
market consists only of the defendants’ product and the 
plaintiff’s product, or whether the market comprises third-
party products as well.  To determine if two products are in 
the same market, we ask “if they are readily substitutable for 
one another,” an inquiry that requires us to assess “the 
reasonable interchangeability of use between a product and its 
substitute.”60  We also look to their cross-elasticity of 
demand, which is defined as “[a] relationship between two 
products, usually substitutes for each other, in which a price 
change for one product affects the price of the other.”61  
 Here, Mylan argues that the relevant market consists of 
generic Doryx and name-brand Doryx and that, within this 
market, Defendants allegedly maintained 100% of sales until 
generics entered.62  We reject Mylan’s position and agree 
with the District Court’s conclusion that the market was much 
broader and consisted of all oral tetracyclines prescribed to 
                                              
58 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307 (internal footnote 
omitted) (citing SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 
1056, 1062-63 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
59 Id. (citing Queen City Pizza Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 
124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
60 Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
325 (1962)). 
61 Black’s Law Dictionary 458 (10th ed. 2014). 
62 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *8. 
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treat acne, a market in which Defendants’ market share never 
exceeded approximately 18%.   
i. Interchangeability 
To define the relevant market, we first consider the 
extent to which Defendants’ product is interchangeable with 
alternative products in the field.63 The term 
“‘[i]nterchangeability’ implies that one product is roughly 
equivalent to another for the use to which it is put.”64   It also 
means that “while there might be some degree of preference 
for . . . one [product] over the other, either would work 
effectively.”65   
 As the District Court accurately observed: 
The record abounds with uncontradicted 
evidence . . .  confirming and reconfirming the 
interchangeability of Doryx with other oral 
tetracyclines.  There is a consensus among 
dermatologists that all oral tetracyclines treat 
acne with similar effectiveness and so are 
interchangeable for that purpose.  The FDA has 
approved virtually identical labeling for most of 
these drugs, stating that in cases of “severe 
                                              
63 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 482 (discussing how 
the interchangeability of products affects the definition of the 
relevant market).  
64 Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 
206 (3d Cir. 1994). 
65 Id.  
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acne” the drugs “may be useful adjunctive 
therapy.”66    
 To further undercut Mylan’s position regarding 
interchangeability, and consistent with the underlying purpose 
of Hatch-Waxman and state substitution laws, health insurers 
and other managed care providers encouraged the widespread 
substitution of numerous other oral tetracyclines for Doryx.  
As the District Court stated: 
Managed care organizations have sought to 
constrain patients to substitute Doryx with 
other, less costly tetracyclines to treat acne. 
Some organizations have removed Doryx as a 
reimbursable medication; others have limited 
any reimbursement.  A number of managed care 
organizations sent notices to healthcare 
providers urging them to substitute other oral 
tetracyclines for Doryx.67 
 Clearly, those in the managed care field acknowledged 
that other, more affordable tetracyclines were fully 
substitutable for Doryx.  Moreover, products need not be 
perfectly fungible to be considered reasonably 
interchangeable for market-definition purposes.68  With all of 
this in view, Mylan simply cannot escape the conclusion that 
                                              
66 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *9 (record citations 
omitted). 
67 Id. at *9 (record citations omitted).   
68 DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 749 F.3d 1332, 1339-
40 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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a high level of product interchangeability existed between 
Doryx and other oral tetracyclines prescribed to treat acne.   
ii. Cross-elasticity of Demand 
 Interchangeability is only one aspect of establishing a 
relevant antitrust market through indirect evidence. In 
addition to evidence establishing Doryx’s interchangeability, 
Defendants also point to their own unrebutted expert evidence 
showing cross-elasticity of demand between Doryx and other 
tetracyclines.  This indirect evidence, they claim, further 
suggests that Defendants did not maintain monopoly power in 
the relevant market. 
 “Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of the 
substitutability of products from the point of view of buyers.  
More technically, it measures the responsiveness of the 
demand for one product [X] to changes in the price of a 
different product [Y].”69  So, for example, if we were to find 
that the Doryx market consisted, as Mylan proposes, only of 
name-brand Doryx and its generic counterpart, the cross-
elasticity of demand between Doryx and other oral 
tetracyclines prescribed to treat acne would be very small, 
showing that Doryx’s price changes had no effect on patient 
demand for those drugs.  Here, as the District Court correctly 
noted, the opposite is true, as the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that “when Defendants increased the price of 
                                              
69 Queen City Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d at 438 n.6 (quoting E. 
Thomas Sullivan and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Understanding 
Antitrust and its Economic Implications 217 (1994)). 
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Doryx, its sales decreased and the sales of other oral 
tetracyclines increased.”70 
 More specifically, Defendants offered unrebutted 
expert testimony, including detailed statistical analyses, 
showing that demand for other generics rose in response to 
certain of Defendants’ strategic marketing and sales 
decisions.  Most convincingly, we view the customer 
response to the various changes in Doryx’s prescription 
couponing scheme, which at times made Doryx more 
expensive than generics for consumers, as a strong indication 
of the existence of cross-elasticity.71  In particular, this 
evidence demonstrated that Defendants responded to the 
market’s reaction to their prices with sales promotions in an 
effort to increase their ability to compete with other 
tetracyclines.  It also showed that when Defendants increased 
the price of Doryx, its sales decreased, and the sales of other 
tetracyclines increased.  Moreover, Mylan offered no 
quantitative analyses to rebut these conclusions, but rather 
simply relied on its own expert’s theoretical views on cross-
elasticity.  Given that Mylan carried the burden of proof in 
defining the market, its evidence was insufficient to create a 
jury question in light of Defendants’ showing of cross-
elasticity of demand.  
 In sum, given the high degree of interchangeability and 
cross-elasticity demonstrated in the record, we agree with the 
                                              
70 Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *10.  
71 For instance, the reports measured the demand between 
Doryx and at least “Adoxa, generic immediate release 
doxycycline hyclate, and generic immediate-release 
doxycycline monohydrate.”  Id. 
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District Court that the relevant market consisted of Doryx and 
other oral tetracyclines prescribed to treat acne.  And, within 
that market, we generally require a plaintiff alleging antitrust 
injury under Section 2 to show that Defendants maintained a 
market share “significantly larger than 55%” to establish 
antitrust liability.72  However, Defendants’ market share in 
the oral tetracycline market was relatively small.  It never 
exceeded 18%.   
c. Anticompetitive Conduct  
 Although the District Court acknowledged that its 
finding with respect to monopoly power resolved the § 2 
monopolization claims, the Court went on to address 
anticompetitiveness because it was necessary to resolve the 
remaining claims.  The District Court concluded that 
Defendants’ “product hopping” strategy was not 
anticompetitive.  Mylan contends that the District Court erred 
in its analysis, specifically with respect to whether 
Defendants’ product changes barred Mylan from taking 
advantage of state substitution laws.  Mylan further claims 
that this case is indistinguishable from the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Namenda and that Defendants’ conduct was 
                                              
72 Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187. In the absence of sufficient 
market share, we have, nonetheless, held that other factors 
may indicate the presence of monopoly power, including 
“size and strength of competing firms, freedom of entry, 
pricing trends and practices in the industry, ability of 
consumers to substitute comparable goods, and consumer 
demand.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Having reviewed the 
record, we conclude that none of those factors are present 
here. 
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undoubtedly anticompetitive.  We discern no error in the 
District Court’s conclusion and reject Mylan’s contentions. 
 We have stated that “[a]nticompetitive conduct may 
take a variety of forms, but it is generally defined as conduct 
to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of 
competition on some basis other than the merits.”73 
Moreover, it is clear that the Sherman Act “directs itself not 
against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but 
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition 
itself.”74 
In addressing allegations of anticompetitive conduct 
based on Defendants’ product hops, the District Court 
properly applied the “rule of reason” burden-shifting 
framework set forth by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp.75  Under that framework, the party seeking to 
impose liability must initially provide evidence of the 
anticompetitive nature of a defendant’s conduct.76  Once 
established, the defendant then has the burden of “proffer[ing] 
‘nonpretextual’ procompetitive justifications for its conduct,” 
and “[t]he plaintiff may then either rebut those justifications 
or demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit.”77  In conducting this analysis, we 
                                              
73 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 308 (citations omitted). 
74 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 
(1993). 
75 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).  
76 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 652 (citing Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d at 58-60).   
77 Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58-59). 
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first consider whether Mylan produced evidence of 
Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct.  The District Court 
concluded that Mylan failed on this front, and we agree.78  
While product hopping under certain circumstances may be 
viewed as anticompetitive conduct, this is not one of those 
cases.  As we explain, Mylan was not foreclosed from the 
market. 
Doryx capsules were available for more than twenty 
years, and generic companies were free to engineer their own 
versions during that time.  At least one did, but not Mylan.79  
Moreover, the record demonstrates that Mylan received 180 
days of exclusive rights to market and sell its 75mg and 
100mg tablets once approved, giving Mylan a significant leg 
up on generic competitors.  And the undisputed evidence 
shows that Mylan set its tablet prices higher than the price of 
branded Doryx for at least some period of time.  Finally, it is 
                                              
78 See Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *12. 
79 The District Court was persuaded by the fact that Mylan 
chose to forego more aggressive research and development, 
marketing, and sales efforts. See, e.g., id. at *13. We realize 
that it may not necessarily be cost-effective for generic 
manufacturers to promote their products with the same level 
of investment as their name-brand counterparts and that 
Hatch-Waxman seems to provide generics the means to 
participate in the market without necessarily promoting their 
products in their same way that name-brand manufacturers 
do.  Nonetheless, as the District Court noted, Mylan is one of 
the largest generic pharmaceutical companies in the world, 
recording nearly $6.13 billion in revenue in 2011.  Id. at *1.  
It is therefore difficult to perceive Mylan as a “David” and 
Defendants as “Goliath” in these circumstances. 
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clear that Mylan reaped generous profits from its sale of the 
generic tablet, in the amount of $146.9 million.  Thus, far 
from being harmed by Defendants’ product changes, Mylan 
was advantaged in the generic market by its 180-day 
exclusivity period and ability to profit generously while 
raising prices.  In sum, we agree with the District Court that 
Mylan failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that 
Defendants engaged in anticompetitive conduct prohibited by 
the Sherman Act, thereby failing on the first prong of the 
Microsoft Corp. test.80 
But even if we were to assume that the first prong of 
the test was met, Defendants have offered strong evidence of 
non-pretextual purposes for their various product changes.  
First, it is clear from the record that doxycycline capsules had 
been linked with esophageal problems.  The capsule version 
of the drug was ultimately banned in France and Sweden, and 
Defendants faced a products liability lawsuit in Michigan 
regarding the same problems.  Second, the record clearly 
demonstrates that Doryx experienced shelf-life stability 
problems, which in 2002 resulted in a largescale recall of 
Doryx capsules.  Third, Defendants introduced different 
dosages for Doryx largely in response to the actions of their 
competitors.  For instance, Defendants offered evidence that 
their decision to introduce the 150mg tablet was in response 
                                              
80 To be sure, we recognize that there are a number of 
documents that suggest that Defendants were, at least in part, 
focused on protecting their name-brand franchise.  While 
these documents may imply that Defendants were motivated 
by an intent to compete with generics, the evidence 
nonetheless demonstrates that Defendants’ product 
modifications had no anticompetitive effects on the market.  
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to the fact that both Adoxa and Solodyn, tetracyclines 
prescribed to treat acne, were offered in a variety of dosages.  
Defendants also offered evidence of a non-pretextual 
justification when they proposed the scoring modifications: 
an ability for consumers to more effectively self-dose at 
patient-specific levels.   
We are also cognizant of the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning in Namenda, which Mylan relies on heavily in its 
briefs.  However, we find Namenda to be factually and 
procedurally distinguishable from this case.   
In Namenda, which was decided a few weeks after the 
District Court’s decision in this case, the Second Circuit 
affirmed a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff, the 
State of New York, forcing the defendants, name-brand drug 
manufacturers, to keep an old version of Namenda IR, a 
prescription drug used to treat dementia, on the market for a 
period of time before introducing the new drug (Namenda 
XR).81  Namenda involved the defendants’ attempts to avoid 
a “patent cliff” – the end of patent exclusivity, corresponding 
to the brand drug’s loss of market share – by stringing 
together new periods of patent exclusivity in order to 
completely bar generics from entering the market.  It was 
alleged that the defendants did so by introducing changes to 
their product to delay the expiration of their patent.82   
Here, there were no patent cliffs on the horizon, and 
the evidence demonstrates that there were plenty of other 
competitors already in the oral tetracycline market.  
                                              
81 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 649-50, 663. 
82 Id. at 647-48. 
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Moreover, as Defendants correctly note in their brief, a 
lawyer for the State of New York in Namenda specifically 
stated that Mylan’s case against the Defendants here, pending 
at the time, was distinguishable from New York’s theory in 
Namenda.83  Echoing this sentiment, the Namenda Court 
itself also persuasively distinguished this case, citing it as an 
example of a situation in which there was no evidence of 
consumer coercion, because generics “had already entered the 
market at the time of defendants’ product reformulation.”84  
Perhaps more importantly, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Namenda merely upheld a preliminary injunction, unlike this 
case, which proceeded through full discovery and resulted in 
a robust record void of any evidence of anticompetitive 
conduct.85   
 Mylan also cites a number of other procedurally 
inapposite cases in which courts have addressed product 
hopping claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage and allowed 
them to proceed against name-brand drug manufacturers.86  
Just as the courts did in those cases, here, the District Court 
allowed Mylan’s claims to proceed against Defendants after 
                                              
83 Defs.’ Br. 4 (citing Dasgupta Letter 1-2, Namenda, 787 
F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624), ECF No. 324). 
84 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 652 n.23 (citing Mylan Pharm., 2015 
WL 1736957, at *13). 
85 Indeed, the parties have provided the court with 21 
appendices of discovery material, consisting of nearly 15,000 
pages. 
86 See Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 681-82; TriCor, 432 F. 
Supp. 2d at 422. 
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denying their motions to dismiss.87  However, after a period 
of exhaustive discovery, the District Court thoroughly 
reviewed the record and concluded that Mylan failed to create 
triable issues of material fact to save any of its Sherman Act 
claims. 
To be clear, we do not rule out the possibility that 
certain insignificant design or formula changes, combined 
with other coercive conduct, could present a closer call with 
respect to establishing liability in future cases.  Thus, after 
applying the Microsoft Corp. framework, courts may need to 
consider a number of additional, non-exhaustive factors.  For 
instance, courts might need to balance the important public 
interest in encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry with our obligations to protect consumers and to 
ensure fair competition under the antitrust laws.  At the same 
time, courts should also be wary both of second-guessing 
Congress’s legislative judgment and of turning courts into 
tribunals over innovation sufficiency.88  Moreover, courts 
                                              
87 See generally Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. 
Co., No. 12-3824, 2013 WL 5692880 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 
2013). 
88 Indeed, Congress could have chosen to bar or significantly 
restrict name-brand drug manufacturers from making changes 
that would delay generic entry, but it did not do so.  See Teva 
Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“Because the balance struck between these competing 
goals is quintessentially a matter for legislative judgment, the 
court must attend closely to the terms in which the Congress 
expressed that judgment.”); Tri-Bio Labs. Inc. v. United 
States, 836 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) (Hatch-Waxman 
reflects a “statutory compromise of . . . competing concerns”).   
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may need to be cognizant of the unique separation between 
consumers and drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical 
market, especially in cases where there is evidence of extreme 
coercion of physician prescribing decisions or blatant 
misrepresentation about a generic manufacturer’s version of a 
drug.89  With all of this said, even in more difficult cases, the 
disposition of each claim will necessarily turn on the facts 
and circumstances surrounding a company’s alleged 
anticompetitive conduct.   
 Of course, we need not reach these additional factors 
because we are not presented with such a close call.  Here, 
Mylan’s claims fail under a straightforward application of the 
Microsoft Corp. framework because Mylan has failed to 
produce evidence that Defendants’ conduct was 
anticompetitive. Because Mylan’s § 2 claims each require a 
showing of anticompetitive conduct in addition to monopoly 
power, we will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Defendants on those claims.90 
                                              
89 A court may also consider whether a so-called “patent cliff” 
is indicative of anticompetitive conduct, especially when a 
defendant’s actions are paired with weak or inconsistent 
evidence of procompetitive justifications. 
90 Mylan also argues, alternatively, that Doryx is an antitrust 
“submarket” within the market for tetracyclines.  We 
disagree.  As noted, the evidence shows that Doryx is 
interchangeable with a wide variety of other tetracyclines.  It 
therefore cannot be argued that the public recognizes Doryx 
as a distinct submarket within the class of tetracyclines. 
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325 (a submarket’s boundaries 
are determined by “such practical indicia as industry or public 
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2. Mylan’s Section 1 Claim: Illegal 
Restraint of  Trade 
 Mylan also argues that the District Court erred by 
granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to 
Mylan’s §1 illegal restraint of trade claim based on the 
District Court’s finding that Mylan produced insufficient 
evidence of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct.  We reject 
Mylan’s contention. 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”91  “To 
establish a [S]ection 1 violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) 
concerted action by the defendants; (2) that produced 
anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and 
geographic markets; (3) that the objects of the conduct 
pursuant to the concerted action were illegal; and (4) that it 
was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action.”92  
As discussed above, Mylan has failed to prove that 
Defendants’ product hops were anticompetitive, as required 
under the second element of this test.93  Thus, the District 
                                                                                                     
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, 
the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique 
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, 
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors”). 
91 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
92 Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 
F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1993). 
93 We have thoroughly reviewed the parties’ remaining 
arguments, including Mylan’s contentions relating to its 
43 
 
Court properly granted Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment on Mylan’s Sherman Act Section 1 claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For substantially the same reasons set forth in the 
District Court’s thorough and persuasive opinion, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
tortious interference with prospective contractual relations 
claim under Pennsylvania law and its Daubert objections, and 
conclude that they are without merit. 
